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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LE.1£ C. FELT, a/k/a 
LEF~ CRAIG FELT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROBERT S. FELT, 
Defendant-Respondent: 
Case No. 
12409 
ABSTRACT O,F RECORD 
R. NO. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
COMPLAINT 
FOR CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFEND-
ANT, PLAINTIFF ALLEGES AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are bona fide and actual 
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah, and have been for 
more than three months immediately prior to the com-
mencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, 
having been married at Salt Lake City, Utah, on or about 
the 17th day of September, 1949. There have been no 
children born as issue of said marriage. 
1 
3. During the past several months the defendant 
has treated the plaintiff in a cruel manner, to the extent 
of causing her great mental distress. 
.. 
2 4. During the marriage of the parties, they have , 
acquired the following property: 
An equity in a residence known as 4147 Emigra-
tion Canyon, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Household furniture, furnishings, appliances 
housekeeping equipment, and other household 
items 
Two automobiles, consisting of a 1963 Volkswagen 
and a 1967 Volkswagen. 
Other assets, the precise nature and extent of 
which are unknown to the plaintiff. 
5. If it shall be shovrn to the satisfaction of the 
court that there are policies of life insurance in force on 
the life of the defendant, it is reasonable and necessary 
that defendant be required to maintain the premiums 
on said policies and that defendant be ordered to effect 
any change which may be necessary to cause the plaintiff 
to become the beneficiary of each of said policies or that 
defendant be enjoined from changing said policies so as 
to eliminate the plaintiff as beneficiary on the same. 
6. The parties have incurred certain obligations 
consisting of household bills. It is necessary and reason-
able that the defendant be ordered to pay all outstanding 
3 obligations of the parties. 
7. It is reasonable and necessary that the plaintiff 
be awarded an equitable portion of the assets of the 
2 
parties, including real and personal property, the savings 
of the parties, and one of the automobiles of the parties, 
and that plaintiff be awarded a reasonable sum as ali-
mony for her maintenance. 
8. Defendant is a healthy and able-bodied person 
and is gainfully employed and without having precise 
knowledge, plaintiff is informed and believes that de-
fendant's net earnings and income exceeds THIRTY-SIX 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($36,000.00) per year. 
9. Plaintiff has engaged attorneys to represent her 
in the prosecution of this action and is obligated to pay 
them a reasonable attorney's fee. Defendant should be 
required to pay a reasonable sum for the use and benefit 
of plaintiff's attorneys. 
WHEHEFORE, PLAINTIFF PRAYS FOR JUDG-
MENT, as follows: 
For a decree of divorce dissolving the bonds of matri-
money now existing between the parties and awarding 
plaintiff an equitable portion of the assets of the parties, 
including real and personal property, the savings of the 
parties, and one of the automobiles of the parties; award-
ing plaintiff a reasonable sum as alimony for the main-
tenance and support of plaintiff; ordering and directing 
the defendant to pay all premiums on any life insurance 
policies now in force on his life, and to cause the plaintiff 
to become or remain the beneficiary of such life insnr-
ance policies, and directing the defendant to pay all the 
outstanding bills and obligations of the parties; awarding 
3 
plaintiff a reasonable sum for attorneys' fees, together 
with costs of this action, and such other and further relief 
as the court may deem just in the premises. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Duly verified and filed April 19, 19G7. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AGREEMEN'L' 
5 THIS AGREEMENT, made and entered into this 
6 
16th day of May, 1967, by and between LEE C. FELT 
(hereinafter sometimes called "plaintiff") and ROBERT 
S. FELT (hereinafter sometimes called "defendant"), 
both of Salt Lake City, State of Utah; 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the parties hereto are now husband and 
wife but have separated, and the above-named plaintiff, 
Lee C. Felt, has heretofore commenced a suit for divorce 
against the defendant, and it is desired to settle and ad-
just all property rights between the parties, and all other 
rights, save and except the marriage relationship. 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby understood and 
agreed: 
4 
I. 
PROPERTY DIVISION 
In settlement, adjustment and compromise of all 
property questions and rights, the property of said par-
ties shall be divided as follows: 
A. LEE C. FELT shall receive and retain as her 
sole and separate property: 
1. The following shares of stock valued as 
of May 4, 1967 : 
(a) Four shares of Hercules stock, Cer-
tificate No. BB35279, registered in the name 
of Lee C. Felt, valued at $50.75 per share. 
(b) One share of Hercules stock, Cer-
tificate No. BB29829, registered in the name 
of Lee C. Felt, valued at $50.75 per share. 
( c) Six shares of CTS Corp. stock, Cer-
tificate No. C015939, registered in the name 
of Lee C. Felt, valued at $31.63 per share. 
( d) Six shares of CTS Corp. stock, Cer-
tificate No. N019209, registered in the name 
of Lee C. Felt, valued at $31.63 per share. 
( e) Nine shares of Gulf Oil Corp. stock, 
Certificate No. N0601145, registered in the 
name of Lee C. Felt, valued at $65.40 per 
share. 
(f) Nine shares of National Airlines 
stock, Certificate No. N0123047, registered in 
the name of Lee C. Felt, valued at $77.25 per 
share. 
5 
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(g) ~i~e shares of National Airlines 
stock, Certificate No. N0122165, registered in 
the name of Lee C. Felt, valued at $77.25 per 
share. 
(h) Four shares of National Airlines 
stock, Certificate No. N0124623, registered in 
the name of Lee C. Felt, valued at $77.25 per 
share. 
( i) Twelve shares of Eastman Kodak 
stock, Certificate No. N081504, registered in 
the name of Lee C. Felt, valued at $143.87 per 
share. 
(j) Ten shares of Johnson & Johnson 
stock, registered in the name of Lee C. Felt, 
valued at $233.00 per share. 
2. A 1964 Volkswagen, registered in the 
name of Robert S. Felt, who agrees that he will 
forthwith transfer and assign all of his right, 
title and interest therein to Lee C. Felt. 
3. The parties to this Agreement hereby con-
firm and acknowledge that Robert S. Felt, is the 
owner of a certain life insurance Policy Number 
316060, Initial Sum Insured - $50,000.00, of which 
the Old Line Life Insurance Company of America, 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, is the Insurer and the 
defendant, Robert S. Felt, is the Insured. Lee C. 
Felt is the beneficiary of said policy. Forthwith 
after the execution of this Agreement, Robert S. 
Felt will make an absolute assignment of all inci-
dents of ownership in said Policy Number 316060 
to Lee C. Felt. Following said absolute assign-
ment, Lee C. Felt will from her own funds pay 
any and all insurance renewal premiums as long 
as she desires to keep said Policy in force and ef-
fect. Provided, further, Lee C. F'elt will have the 
right to name anyone she chooses as the bene-
6 
ficiary on said Polic~y No. 316060, including her-
self. Robert S. Felt agrees that he will at all 
times in the future cooperate with Lee C. Felt 
in keeping said Policy Number 316060 in force and 
effect, except Robert S. Felt will have no obliga-
tion to pay any future renewal premiums. Fur-
ther, if in Lee C. Felt's discretion, said Policy 
Number 316060 is converted into a different type 
of life insurance policy or if the same is cancelled 
and Lee C. Felt desires to replace said Policy 
N mnber 316060 with other life insurance on the 
life of Robert S. Felt, the defendant agrees that he 
will cooperate in all ways with the plaintiff in ob-
taining such conversion or new insurance, includ-
ing but not restricted to cooperating in submitting 
himself to a physical examination as may be re-
quired by the insuring company or companies. 
4. Robert S. Felt herein shall forthwith as-
sign to Lee C. Felt all right and interest in or to 
any insurance in force upon any personal property 
delivered to and/or conveyed to Lee C. Felt pur-
suant to the terms of this Agreement and deliver 
to her any and all applicable insurance policies. 
B. ROBERT S. FELT shall receive and retain as 
his sole and separate property those properties decribed 
below: 
1. The following shares of stock in and to 
which Lee C. Felt shall forthwith assign to Robert 
S. Felt, all of her right, title and interest: 
(a) Any and all shares of stock of Medi-
cal Arts Building Co., of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
standing in the names of Robert S. Felt 
and/or Lee C. Felt; in this regard, Lee C. Felt 
shall assign and transfer to Robert S. Felt all 
of her right, title and interest in and to 750 
7 
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shares of Medical Arts stock registered in the 
names of the parties and valued at approxi-
mately $1.00 per share, as follows: 
(1) One Hundred shares of stock 
Certificate No. 1437, purchased Octobe; 
13, 1965; 
(2) Two Hundred shares of stock 
Certificate No. 1223, purchased Octobe; 
28, 1960; 
(3) Three Hundred Fifty shares of 
stock, Certificate No. 1420, purchased 
March 15, 1965; 
( 4) One Hundred shares of stock, 
Certificate No. 1465, purchased August 9, 
1966. 
2. One share of stock (a social membership) 
and a certain note (Promissory Note dated Janu-
ary 5, 19·67, No. F-301, Series F) in the principal 
amount of $560.00, wherein Robert S. Felt is shown 
as the member of said University Club and plain-
tiff and defendant are shown as joint payees of 
said note. Plaintiff agrees to assign said note to 
the defendant. 
3. A 1967 Volkswagen registered in the name 
of Lee C. Felt, who agrees that she will forthwith 
transfer and assign all of her right, title and in-
terest therein to Robert S. Felt. 
4. Except for plaintiff's personal bank ac-
count at Foothill Village Branch of Walker Bank 
& Trust Co., which shall belong to plaintiff, the 
balances outstanding as of the date of the parties' 
separation in all bank accounts, whether savings 
or checking, standing the names of either the par-
ties jointly or Robert S. Felt alone, which balances 
Robert S. Felt represents are negligible. 
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5: Al~ office equipment, medical equipment, 
supplies, fixtures, furniture and any other items 
use~ by Robert S. :B-,elt or in any way appropriate 
to his practice of his profession. 
6. All accounts receivable arising out of pro-
fessional services rendered by Robert S. Felt, and 
goods sold in connection therewith. 
7. Any and all other insurance policies, 
whether the same be life insurance, health and 
accident insurance or disability insurance, wherein 
defendant is the insured. 
C. JOINT TENANCY PROPERTY. 
1. Residential Property. The residence of 
the parties located at 4147 Emigration Canyon, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and vested in said parties 
in joint tenancy with right of survivorship, shall 
forthwith be listed for sale with a licensed broker, 
mutually acceptable to the parties, and sold with 
all dispatch compatible with realizing from such 
sale thE' reasonable market value of said realty 
and improvements, it being agreed that the ap-
praised value of $24,750.00 is reasonable. Sub-
sequent to said sale and the payment of commis-
sions, mortgages, taxes, closing costs, and fees 
normally paid by the Seller of realty and all ex-
penses required in order to consummate the sale 
of the aforesaid real property, the proceeds there-
after remaining shall be divided and delivered to 
the parties in equal shares, share and share alike, 
it being understood that said equal shares of said 
proceeds constitute the separate properties of each 
party and are not held in joint tenancy, 
2. Piitnarn Growth Fund Stock. Robert S. 
Felt shall forthwith cause to be transferred and 
delivered to Lee C. Felt as her sole and separate 
property 189 shares (valued at approximately 
9 
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$13.37 per share) out of total of 8-±G. 7 shares of the 
Putnam Growth Fund, all of which shares are now 
registered in the name of Robert S. Felt. The 
remaining G44.7 sharrs of the Putnam Growth 
Fund shall he and remain the sole and separate 
property of Robert S. Felt. 
3. Star Broadcasting Company Stock and 
Drbenturc. rrhe parties acknowledge and confirm 
that they are owners, as joint knants, of 3,000 
shares of Star Broadcasting Company, valued at 
$6,000.00, a debenture in the original principal 
amount of $6,500.00, wherein the parties hereto 
are payees and Star Broadcasting Company is the 
obligor, and 10 shares of stock in a company known 
as Pueblo Supermarkets Inc., valued at $20.00 per 
share. The parties agree that the assets described 
in this paragraph will be divided equally between 
them, each to share and own one-half thereof, as 
his or her separate property. In this regard, each 
party agr<:>es to execute and deliver to and in 
favor of the other party such assignments, trans-
£ ers or documents as may be necessary to effectu-
ate such equal division and separte ownership. 
D. The parties acknowledge and confirm that they 
are the owners of certain household forni tu re, fixtures, 
equipment, paintings and miscellaneous properties. The 
parties further acknowledge and confirm that they have 
reached an understanding relative to the division of 
ownership of said items. 
E. JOINT INDEBTEDNESS. 
1. The parties shall each pay one-half (lh) 
of the balances remaining in charge accounts 
standing in the names of the parties or either of 
10 
them at Z.C.1!.L and Makoff's, of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, amountmg to about $750.00. 
2. rche parties know of no other unpaid in-
debtednesses contracted either before or since 
their separation. To the extent there are other 
indebtednesses, the party who contracted such in-
debtednesses shall pay the same. Provided, Robert 
S. Felt shall pay any debts incurred in connection 
with normal living and household expenses incur-
red prior to separation. 
II 
ALIMONY SETTLEMENT 
The parties agree to an alimony settlelment as fol-
lows, except that if the plaintiff should die or remarry, 
or if the defendant should die, the obligation of the de-
fendant to pay alimony to the plaintiff shall immediately 
cease and terminate. 
A. Robert S. Felt hereby agrees to pay 
$500.00 to the plaintiff Lee C. Felt, upon the exe-
cution of this instrument, and thereafter to pay 
to the plaintiff Lee C. Felt as permanent alimony, 
the sum of $1,000.00 per month, payable each and 
every month on or before the first day of the 
month, commencing on June 1, 1967. 
B. It is further agreed by and between the 
parties that the amount of the aforesaid alimony 
for the support of Lee C. Felt is a reasonable 
sum in view of the efforts made by plaintiff in as-
sisting defendant in his professional education 
and considering the present circumstances and 
social standing now enjoyed by Lee C. Felt; and 
that said amount shall not hereafter be adjusted, 
notwithstanding increases or decreases in any 
amount in the income of plaintiff, and notwith-
11 
standing any changes in the income of the def end-
ant unless said changes are substantial and so de-
crease the defendant's income so that defendant is 
reasonably unable to pay the alimony agreed to 
herein. · 
III. 
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
A. It is further agred that should any instrument 
of conveyance or transfer or other instrument be required 
from either of said parties to the other or to any other 
person, to perfect the title to any property divided, trans-
ferred or conveyed pursuant to this Agreement, each 
party agrees with the other that he and/or she will exe-
cute and deliver the same. 
B. Each party hereby waives any and all rights in 
the estate of the other and forever quitclaims to the other 
any and all right to share in the property of the other by 
the laws of succession. 
C. Each of the parties hereby covenants and agrees 
not to contract any debt, charge or liability whatsoever 
for which the other of them or his or her property or 
estate shall or may become liable or answerable. 
D. Each of the parties hereby covenants with the 
other, that the party making such covenant has no knowl-
edge whatsoever as to any asset of any kind in which the 
15 party so covenanting has any legal or beneficial interest, 
aside from those assets already listed, identified and con-
tained herein. In the event either party hereto is violat-
ing said covenant by concealing any asset to which he 
12 
or she has right, title, or interest, it is agreed that the 
party so violating such covenant shall be liable in dam-
ages to the other party for the full value of any such 
asset so concealed. Specifically, defendant acknowledges, 
confinns and represents, as an inducement in causing 
plaintiff to execute this Agreement, that this Agreement 
discloses all of the holdings and assets of defendant and 
that he owns no substantial assets not herein specified. 
E. Minor variations in the balances in checking and 
savings and loan accounts, computations of interest ac-
crued or accruing, but yet unpaid, values of stock, or 
other personal property which is the subject of this 
Agreement, shall not affect the enforceability of this 
Agreement. 
F. The parties heretofore, before the execution of 
this Agreement, physically divided and took into their 
respective personal possession all tangible chattles in 
which either party hereto has any interest or in which the 
parties have agreed to a division of their interests and 
which are not hereinabove specifically referred to, and 
each party does hereby quitclaim to the other party his 
interest in and to the tangible chattles now in the pos-
li! session of the other party, and each party shall retain 
all of the personal property that is in the possession of 
either of them as his or her sole and separate property, 
as the case may be. 
G. It is hereby agreed and understood that each 
party hereto shall pay and be liable for his or her own 
costs and attorneys' fees in connection with the divorce 
action on file herein and any agreements, conveyances 
13 
and/or other transactions pursuant thereto or in connPe-
tion therewith. 
H. Each party to this Agreement herewith solemnly 
and specifically avers that the foregoing Agreement has 
been entered into without influence, fraud, coercion or 
misrepresentation. 
IV 
INCORPORATION OF AGREEMENT IN DECREE 
Upon the granting by the court of a divorce to the 
plaintiff herein, it is agreed that the provisions of this 
Agreement shall constitute a stipulation and shall he 
incorporated by reference into the final decree of the 
court. 
v 
AGREEMENT CONCERNING INCOME TAX 
DEFICIENCIES 
In the event any Federal or State income taxes are 
asserted against the parties, or either of them for the 
calendar year 1966, or preceding years, the defendant 
will pay such deficiencies for said years as either or both 
of the parties are legally obligated to pay. 
17 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, said parties hereto, 
after consultation with their respective counsel relative 
to the matter herein set forth and agreed upon, having 
been advised fully and fairly as to all of the facts and 
circumstances herein set forth, have hereunto set their 
hands and seals this 16 day of May, 1967. 
s/ Lee C. Felt 
s/ Robert S. Felt 
14 
COUNSELS' AP PROV AL OF PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
The tmdersigned being counsel for the plaintiff and 
defendant named above do hereby acknowledge and con-
firm their approval of the Property Settlement Agree-
ment contained above. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 16th day of May, 
1967. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Counsel for Plaintiff 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Counsel for Defendant 
Duly verified and filed May 17, 1967. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
ENTRY OF APPEARANCE, CONSENT AND 
WAIVER 
DEFENDANT, ROBERT S. FELT, by and through 
his attorney, Grant C. Aadnesen, hereby enters his ap-
pearance in the above entitled matter and acknowledges, 
consents and waives as follows: 
1. Acknowledges receipt of the Complaint filed in 
this action and acknowledges and affirms that certain 
Property Settlement Agreement made and entered into 
by and between the parties hereto. 
15 
2. Consents to the waiver of the statutory waiting 
period of ninety (90) days otherwise provided for under 
the laws of the State of Utah, and joins in the Motion 
of the Plaintiff to the Court requesting the same. 
3. Consents to the hearing of said divorce proceed-
ings forthwith and upon the merits and to the entry of 
19 a divorce in favor of the Plaintiff and against the De-
fendant, both in accordance with the terms of the Com-
plaint and in accordance with the terms of the Property 
Settlement e.s such amends said Complaint. 
May 16, 1967. 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Counsel for Defendant 
Duly verified and filed May 17, 1967. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
CONSENT AND WAIVER 
20 Plaintiff, LEE C. FELT, a/k/a LEE CRAIG FELT, 
by and through her attorneys, VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall 
& McCarthy, by Thomas M. Burton, hereby consents and 
waives as follows : 
1. Consents to the waiver of the statutory waiting 
period of ninety (90) days otherwise provided for by 
the laws of the State of Utah. 
2. Consents to the hearing of said divorce proceed-
ings forthwith and upon the merits and to the entry of 
a divorce in favor of the Plaintaiff and aganist the De-
16 
fendant, and to the division and settlement of the prop-
erties and assets of the parties and to the payment of ali-
mony in accordance with the terms of that certain Prop-
erty Settlement Agreement on file herein. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Duly verified and filed May 17, 1967. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
STIPULATION, MOTION AND ORDER 
It is hereby stipulated by the parties through their 
respective counsel and in accordance with a medical 
opinion attached hereto and made a part hereof, that the 
ninety (90) day waiting period required under Utah law 
may be waived and that the divorce proceedings herein 
may be heard forthwith and upon the merits. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
MOTION 
Upon stipulation and good cause appearing, Plain-
tiff hereby moves the Court for an order waiving the 
ninety (90) day waiting period for hearing of the cause 
17 
23 
on the merits and entry of a decreP. Tn support of this 
Motion, counsel represents to the Court as follows, to-wit: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant have agreed in writing 
to a division and settlement regarding their joint, mutual 
and individual rights in and to all properties and assets 
of the parties. 
2. The complaint of Plaintiff herein has not been 
answered by Defendant, thereby rendering uncontested 
the grounds upon which Plaintiff has brought her action 
for divorce. 
3. The Plaintiff and Defendant have each executed 
and filed with the Court a consent to the request contained 
in this Motion and a waiver of said nint>ty (90) day wait-
ing period. 
4. Plaintiff and Defendant have bt>en and presently 
are represented by counsel. 
5. Plaintiff and Defendant do not have any children 
born of the union of said marriage. 
6. As is more particularly evidenced by the state-
ment of Plaintiff's doctor, which is attached to this Mo-
tion and submitted herewith, the Plaintiff has been suf-
fering and continues to suffer serious health problt>ms 
as a result of the emotional involvements and disturb-
ances connected with the divorce matters and proceedings 
herein and the Plaintiff's health will be impaired by 
' 
awaiting the elapse of the ninety (90) day waiting period. 
Dated this 17th day of May, 1967. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
18 
ORDER 
Upon stipulation and motion duly made and good 
cause appearing therefor and the parties respectively 
having filed herein their written consent to waiver the 
ninety (90) day waiting period, the Court, being satisfied 
that no good purpose shall be served in awaiting the 
elapse of said waiting period and that such may cause 
irreparable harm to the Plaintiff. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED 
that the hearing in this cause may proceed forthwith and 
that the customary ninety (90) day waiting period be 
and the same is hereby waived. 
MADE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1967. 
D. FRANK WILKINS, JUDGE 
Duly attested and filed May 17, 1967. 
( 'ritle of Court and Cause) 
DECREE 
'l'HIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing be-
fore the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, Judge, on the 17th 
day of May, 19G7. The Plaintiff appeared in person and 
b~· her attorney, Thomas M. Burton, of the firm VanCott, 
Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. The Defendant has been 
served with a Summons herein and filed herein his writ-
ten entry of appearance, but did not file answer to the 
complaint or other pleadings, and his default was duly 
<>ntered according to law. Each of the parties filed a 
19 
written consent to the waiver of the usual ninety (90) day 
waiting period for the entry of a decree and said ninety 
(90) day waiting period was waived by the Court for 
26 good cause shown. The parties have filed herein their 
written Property Settlement Agreement. The cause has 
been submitted to and considered by the Court and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises and having 
heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HERE.BY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Plaintiff, Lee C. 
Felt, a/k/a Lee Craig Felt, be and she is hereby granted a 
Decree of Divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony ex-
isting between Plaintiff and Defendant, said decree to 
become final and absolute upon the expiration of three 
(3) months from date hereof, and that Plaintiff be and 
is hereby awarded certain real and personal property 
and also the sum of $1,000.00 alimony payable monthly, 
pursuant to and as provided by the terms of that certain 
Property Settlement Agreement entered into by and 
between the parties herein, and by this reference incorpo-
rated herein as is fully and completely set forth, which 
Property Settlement Agreement the Court hereby adopts 
as fair and reasonable. 
MADE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1967. 
D. FRANK WILKINS, JUDGE 
Duly attested and filed May 17, 1967. 
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(Title of Court and Cause) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW 
2i THIS MATTER came on regularly for hearing be-
fore the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, Judge, on the 17th 
day of May, 1967. The Plaintiff appeared in person and 
by her attorney, Thomas M. Burton, of the firm Van 
Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy. The Defendant 
has been served with a Summons herein and filed herein 
his written entry of appearance, but did not file answer 
to the complaint or other pleadings, and his default was 
duly entered according to law. Each of the parties filed 
a written consent to the waiver of the usual (90) day 
waiting period for the entry of a decree and said ninety 
(90) day waiting period was waived by the Court for 
good cause shown. The parties have filed herein their 
28 written Property Settlement Agreement. The cause has 
been submitted to and considered by the Court and the 
Court being fully advised in the premises now makes the 
following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide and actual 
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah, and have been for 
more than three months immediately prior to the com-
mencement of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, 
having been married at Salt Lake City, Utah, on or about 
the 17th day of September, 1949. There have been no 
children born as issue of said marriage. 
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3. During the past several months the Defendant 
has treated the Plaintiff in a cruel manner, to the extent 
of causing her great mental distress. 
4. The customary ninety (90) day waiting period 
for the entry of a decree herein should be waived for the 
reason that the continuance of the marriage during said 
waiting period may result in irreparable harm to the 
Plaintiff. 
5. During the marriage, the parties have acquired 
assets, the precise nature, extent and division of which 
are contained in that certain Property Settlement Agree-
ment between the parties, the original of which is on file 
herein and by this reference incorporated herein and 
made a part hereof as if fully and completely set forth. 
The Court hereby finds that said Property Settleuwnt 
Agreement is fair and reasonable and the same is hereby 
adopted and approved by the Court. 
29 From the foregoing Finding of Fact, the Court makes 
the following : 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce 
dissolving the bonds of matrimony existing between 
Plaintiff and Defendant. The properties of the parties 
should be divided in accordance with that certain Prop-
erty Settlement Agreement incorporated herein by refer-
ence as aforesaid, and the Plaintiff should be awarded the 
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sum of $1,000.00 per month alimony as provided by the 
terms of said Property Settlement Agreement. 
MADE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 1967. 
D. FRANK WILKINS, JUDGE 
Duly attested and filed May 17, 1967. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
REPOR'rER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING ON 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT SEEKING A DECREE 
OF DIVORCE, HELD ON MAY 17, 1967, BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE D. FRANK WILKINS, DISTRICT 
JUDGE OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT. 
21± The record shows that Plaintiff's Complaint was 
filed on April 19, 1967 and that a Consent and Waiver was 
submitted by the Plaintiff wherein she consented that the 
matter be heard prior to the expiration of the 90-day wait-
ing period. There was a Stipulation and Motion filed and 
an Entry of Appearance, Consent and Waiver for the De-
fendant by and through his attorney, whereby the Defend-
ant acknowledged receipt of the Complaint and consented 
that the 90-day period be waived if the Court granted 
Plaintiff's motion and consented to hearing the matter 
without further notice to him. 
Mrs. Lee C. Felt, the Plaintiff, was presented to the 
213 Court b~' her attorney. Reference was made by the Court 
to Plaintiff's motion to shorten the 90-day waiting period 
for hearing the matter on the grounds that delay would 
23 
cause the Plaintiff additional physical and emotional dis-
turbance. The Plaintiff testified that she agreed with her 
doctor's report to the effect that waiver of the 90-day 
216 waiting period would alleviate some of the physical and 
emotional disturbance from which she had been suffering. 
Plaintiff's motion to shorten the 90-day period was 
granted and the default of the Defendant was entered 
on the basis of the pleadings previously filed. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Mrs. Lee C. Felt testified that she was the Plaintiff 
m the divorce action on file, that she was married to 
Robert S. Felt, the Defendant, on September 17, 1949, and 
that she and her husband had been bona fide residents of 
Salt Lake County, Utah, for more than three months 
immediately preceding the divorce action. No children 
217 had been born of the marriage. Mrs. Felt declared that 
her husband had treated her in a cruel manner causing 
her great mental distress during the past several months. 
She stated her husband had indicated he no longer loved 
her, that he remained absent from their home for sub-
stantial periods of time, that he came in late without suit-
able explanation, and that he was constantly critical of 
her and her household management. 
During their marriage, Mrs. Felt had been employed 
all but two years and was the main source of income for 
the first seven years while her husband was completing 
his medical training. Mrs. Felt stated that she was 
218 familiar with a document entitled, "Property Settlement 
Agreement" which she had read, consulted counsel about 
24 
and signed. She testified that she was familiar with her 
husband's signature and that the same appeared on page 
13 of said Agreement. The Agreement was offered and 
received by the Court as part of the file in the matter. 
Mrs. Felt was satisfied with the division of assets set 
forth in the Agreement and felt the same to be fair and 
reasonable. She also felt that the provision in said Agree-
ment which specified an alimony payment of $1,000.00 per 
month was reasonable and agreed with all other aspects 
of said Agreement. 
In response to questions by the Court, it was the 
opinion of Plaintiff and her counsel that after division of 
the assets pursuant to said Agreement, each party would 
receive between $10,000 and $15,000. The Court asked 
if there was any cut-off date on the alimony, to which 
Plaintiff's counsel replied that the alimony payments 
would only terminate in the event of Plaintiff's death 
or remarriage or if the Defendant was unable because 
of some change of circumstances to earn the type of 
money he is now earning. It was stated by Plaintiff's 
counsel that the Defendant had gross income in the neigh-
borhood of $60,000.00 in 1966. Mrs. Felt commented that 
Defendant's gross income was more than that and her 
counsel agreed. 
The Court asked Mrs. Felt if she worked now and if 
she intended to work, to which she replied, "I work part 
time. I do radio and TV commercials part time, and I hope 
to work again." The Court responded, "That wouldn't 
surprise me ... So you can supplement your income, this 
one thousand, to some extent~" Mrs. Felt answered 
"Yes." 
25 
The Plaintiff then stated that she did not condone 
the actions of her husband in staying away for periods 
of time and that they had never had marriage counseling. 
222 She did not feel that marriage counseling would be of help 
in this matter if ordered. 
The divorce was then granted to the Plaintiff ac-
cording to the prayer of the Complaint except where the 
prayer was modified by the Property Settlement Agre€-
ment which was on file and approved by the Court. 
BETH N. RENSHAW 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
Duly certified November 17, 1970 and filed December 3, 
1970. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
PETITION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. 
33 Petitioner respectfully represents unto the court and 
petitions as follows: 
1. On or about the 17th day of May, 1967, the court 
herein awarded to the plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, a/k/a Lee 
Craig Felt, a divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony 
existing between plaintiff and defendant and ordering 
the division of real and personal property pursuant to the 
terms of that certain Property Settlement Agreement 
entered into by and between the plaintiff and the defend-
26 
ant on the 16th day of May, 1967, and specifically ap-
proved by the court herein and incorporated in the Decree 
by reference. Paragraph II of said Settlement Agree-
ment contains the following provisions regarding alimony 
payable by the defendant to the plaintiff: 
A. Robert S. Felt hereby agrees to pay 
$500.00 to the plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, upon the exe-
cution of this instrument, and thereafter to pay to 
the plaintiff Lee C. Felt, as permanent alimony, 
the sum of $1,000 per month, payable each and 
every month on or before the first day of the 
month, commencing on June 1, 1967. 
2. Defendant has without explanation failed and 
refused to make said payments of $1,000 per month as a 
result of which there is presently past due and owing to 
plaintiff under the terms of said Decree the amount of 
$3,100. 
3. It has been necessary for plaintiff to employ 
counsel to prosecute this petition and a reasonable sum 
for the services of said attorneys is $100. 
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that an order be 
entered requiring the defendant to show cause, if any he 
has, why judgment should not be entered against him 
in the amount of $3,100 due under the terms of said 
Decree and, if the same is not paid forthwith, to show 
cause why the defendant should not be held in contempt 
of court, and that said order further provide for payment 
27 
by defendant to plaintiff of the sum of $100 attorney's 
fees and petitioner's costs incurred herein. . 
DATED this 7th day of October, 1969. 
s/ Lee C. Felt 
Petitioner 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORWNALL & McCARTHY 
Attorney for Petitioner 
Duly verified and filed October 8, 1969. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
30 BASED UPON the verified petition of the plaintiff 
herein, a copy of which is attached hereto, and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant, 
Robert S. Felt, be and appear before the Honorable Em-
mett L. Brown, one of the Judges of the above-entitled 
court, at room 1, New Courts Building, 240 East 4th 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 21st day of October 
1969, at 10 :00 o'clock a.m. then and there to show cause, 
if any he has, why judgment should not be entered against 
the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of 
$3,100 together with interest thereon, attorney's fees in 
the sum of $100 and costs of this proceeding. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant ap-
pear at said time and place to show cause, if any he has, 
28 
why he should not be held in contempt of court for failing 
to abide by the terms of the Decree entered in the above-
entitled cause on the 17th day of May, 1967. 
ii MADE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 
37 
1969. 
EMMETT L. BROWN, JUDGE 
Duly attested and filed October 14, 1969. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
MOTION TO AMEND DIVORCE DECREE AND 
NOTICE 
MOTION 
Based on the file herein and the Affidavit attached 
and documents and evidence that will be obtained by dis-
covery and presented herein, defendant moves the court 
for an Order eliminating alimony herein and terminating 
plaintiff's rights to maintain life insurace policies on de-
fendant's life, and to amend the divorce decree herein ac-
cordingly. 
DATED this 13th day of November, 1969. 
GAYLE DEAN HUNT 
Attorney for Defendant 
Duly verified and filed November 14, 1969. 
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(Title of Court and Cause) 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT S. FELT 
43 STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ROBERT S. FE.LT, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says that he is the defendant in the above named ac-
tion and that the Divorce Decree in the above named 
action should be altered to substantially reduce alimony 
now set at $1,000.00 per month or to eliminate the same 
for the following reasons : 
1. At the time of the Divorce Decree herein, defend-
ant was prevailed upon by plaintiff and counsel-both 
her's and his - and urged to consent to an alimony decree 
which he was persuaded he could maintain and that was 
fair under the circumstances, however circumstances 
since, including his health conditions, have demonstrated 
that it is not only impossible for him to maintain such an 
amount of alimony but that the same was unreasonable 
and unfair at the time and at the present time is not 
only unfair and unreasonable but impossible. 
2. Since said Divorce Decree the defendant has re-
married and now has two additional dependents: his wife 
and a child. 
3. The work load necessary to maintain in order to 
make the payments in question is professionally inadvis-
able and unwise and impossible from the standpoint of 
defendant's mental and physical health. 
30 
4. Since the date of said divorce in May, 1967, the 
defendant's income is either less or approximately the 
same, however costs of doing business, professional costs 
of various kinds, and living costs have drastically in-
creased. 
5. Defendant has substantial indebtedness and has 
not been able to reduce the same since said divorce and 
this principally because of said enormous alimony pay-
ments. 
'1 6. The plaintiff, on the other hand, at the time of 
the said divorce was employed only part time with modest 
income, however she has, since said time, become fully 
employed with part time fees and income in addition to 
full time employment. 
7. Furthermore, the plaintiff has substantial stock 
and investments including substantial amounts of blue 
chip securities-for instance, Hercules Powder Company, 
CTS Corporation, Gulf Oil Corporation, National Air 
Lines, Eastman Kodak, Johnson & Johnson, Putnam 
Growth Fund Stock, Star Broadcasting Company stock 
and other stocks in addition to stock purchased since said 
divorce; also plaintiff realized in the divorce settlement 
substantial cash, personal property and automobile, etc. 
8. The plaintiff is in good health, employed and 
employable and, in good conscience, from any standpoint, 
ought no longer to be dependent upon the defendant for 
any portion of her livelihood. The plaintiff has a masters 
degree in speech and a minor college degreti in English 
31 
and is well qualified to earn a substantial livelihood in a 
variety of different fields. 
9. At the time of the said divorce the defendant 
was prevailed upon to allow the continuance upon his life 
for plaintiff's benefit, of two life insurance policies and, 
whether or not there was reason at the time of said 
divorce for the maintenance of such insurance for the 
benefit of plaintiff, at the present time there is no reason 
whatsoever, in law or justice, to allow the maintenance 
and continuance of said life insurance policies. 
DATED this 15 day of November, 1969. 
s/ Robert S. Felt 
Duly verified and filed November 19, 1969. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S AFFIDAVIT 
53 COMES NOW the plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, a/k/a Lee 
Craig Felt, and being first duly sworn, deposes and re-
plies to defendant's Affidavit filed herein in support of 
Motion to Amend Divorce Decree as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Defendant's Affidavit fails to state any ground upon 
which modification of the Decree herein could be granted. 
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SECOND DEFENSE 
The defendant agreed upon and the court approved 
as fair and reasonable alimony of $1,000 per month in 
consideration of the efforts made by the plaintiff in as-
sisting the defendant in his professional education, and in 
view of the circumstances and social standing of the plain-
).J: tiff. The agreement was signed and the Decree was en-
tered in contemplation of the likelihood of future em-
ployment by the plaintiff and with knowledge of her 
education, training, experience and ability and accord-
ingly, the same do provide that said alimony should not 
thereafter be adjusted, notwithstanding increases or de-
creases in any amount in the income of plaintiff, and not-
withstanding any changes in the income of the defendant 
unless said changes were substantial and so decreased 
the defendant's income as to render him reasonably un-
able to pay said alimony. 
THIRD DEFENSE. 
1. Denies each and every statement contained in 
paragraph 1. Defendant is a highly educated, trained and 
experienced physician. Both defendant and his counsel 
read and approved the Property Settlement Agreement 
on May 16, 1967, as evidenced by their signatures affixed 
in witness thereof. On May 17, 1967, the Honorable D. 
Frank Wilkins, judge of the above-entitled court, entered 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree in-
corporating therein said Property Settlement Agree-
ment and approving the same as fair and reasonable. De-
fendant's health is in no manner substantially or per-
33 
manently impaired so as to render it impossible or sub-
stantially more difficult for defendant to maintain the 
alimony payments as decreed. 
2. Plaintiff admits that defendant has remarried 
since the entry of said decree but denies each and every 
other statement contained in paragraph 2 of defendant's 
Affidavit. 
55 3. Denies paragraph 3 of defendant's Affidavit. 
4. Admits that since May 1967 the cost of living 
has increased, because of which the alimony amounts 
should not be reduced. Plaintiff denies each and every 
other statement contained in paragraph 4. 
5. Denies paragraph 5 of defendant's Affidavit. 
6. Admits paragraph 6 of defendant's Affidavit. 
7. Replying to paragraph 7, plaintiff received cer-
tain personal property pursuant to and as enumerated 
in said Property Settlement Agreement and has there-
after purchased further items of personal property. 
Plaintiff denies that she has substantial stock or invest-
ments. 
8. Replying to paragraph 8, plaintiff admits that 
she has educational degrees as stated, is in good health, 
and employed, but denies each and every other statement 
therein contained. 
9. Replying to paragraph 9, plaintiff admits that 
she is the beneficiary of two insurance policies on the 
defendant's life but denies each and every other state-
34 
ment therein contained. As to said policies, plaintiff has 
paid since said Decree and now does pay the premiums. 
DATED this 21st day of November, 1969. 
s/LEE C. FELT 
Duly verified and filed November 21, 1969. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
JUDGMENT 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable D. Frank Wilkins, judge, on 
the 2nd day of December, 1969, pursuant to an Order to 
Show Cause on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff ap-
peared by her attorney Thomas M. Burton and the de-
fendant appeared by his attorney Gayle Dean Hunt. Upon 
stipulation of the parties and the Court being fully ad-
vised in the premises, now therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND 
DECREED that the plaintiff be and she is hereby award-
ed judgment against the defendant in the sum of $4,600.00 
for unpaid alimony pursuant to Decree herein computed 
through the month of December, 1969, with interest there-
on at the legal rate of 8 percent from date hereof, and for 
the further sum of $100.00 attorney's fees, plus her 
costs incurred. 
DATED this 9th day of December, 1969. 
D. FRANK WILKINS, JUDGE 
Duly attested and filed December 9, 1969. 
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(Title of Court and Cause) 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
Respodent's attorney filed a short brief with the 
court setting forth arguments in support of modification 
of the alimony decree. These arguments are not sum-
marized herein as they will most likely be contained in 
Respondent's brief in this matter. 
Filed January 23, 1970. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
BY PLAINTIFF FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER 
Appellant filed the captioned Memorandum setting 
forth arguments in opposition to Respondent's motion to 
modify the alimony decree. These arguments are not re-
produced here as they will be contained in Appellant's 
brief. 
Filed January 23, 1970. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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(Title of Court and Cause) 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
136 BASED UPON the verified petition of the plaintiff 
herein, a copy of which is attached hereto, and good 
cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant 
Robert S. Felt be and appear before the Honorable 
Emmett L. Brown, one of the Judges of the above-entitled 
Court, New Courts Building, 240 East Fourth South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on the 6th day of August, 1970, at 9 :00 
o'clock a.m., then and there to show cause, if any he has, 
why judgment should not be entered against the defend-
ant and in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $8,000.00 
together with interest thereon, attorney's fees in the 
sum of $250.00 and costs. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant 
appear and show cause, if any he has, why he should not 
be found in contempt for failing to abide by the terms of 
the decree entered in thf' above-entitled cause on the 17th 
day of May, 1967, and the judgment entered in the above-
entitled cause on the 9th day of December, 1969. 
MADE AND ENTERED this 28th day of July, 1970. 
EMMETT L. BROWN, JUDGE 
Duly attested and filed July 30, 1970. 
37 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
JUDGMENT 
139 rrhe above entitled matter came on regularly for 
hearing before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall, Judge, on 
the 6th day of August, 1970, pursuant to an Order to 
Show Cause on behalf of the plaintiff. The plaintiff ap. 
peared with her attorney, Thomas M. Burton, and the 
defendant appeared with his attorney, Gayle Dean Hunt. 
Evidence was offered on behalf of the parties and the 
court having heard argument and being fully advised in 
the premises, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED that pursuant to Decree 
herein, the plaintiff be and she is awarded judgment 
against defendant in the sum of $8,000.00 for unpaid ali-
mony from January 1, 1970 through August 31, 1970, with 
interest thereon at the legal rate of 8% from date hereof, 
and her costs incurred. 
DATED this 18th day of August, 1970. 
GORDON R. HALL, JUDGE 
Duly attested and filed August 18, 1970. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
ORDER 
182 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Order to Show 
Cause why defendant should not be found in contempt of 
court for failure to pay alimony to plaintiff from and 
38 
after January 1, 1970, is here by continued until Thurs-
day, October 1, 1970, at the hour of 2:00 o'clock p.m., at 
which time said matter shall be further heard and con-
sidered by the court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant's Mo-
tion to Modify Divorce Decree is hereby set for hearing on 
Thursday, October 1, 1970, at the hour of 2 :30 o'clock 
p.m. 
DATED this 18th day of August, 1970. 
GORDONR. HALL, JUDGE 
Duly attested and filed August 18, 1970. 
('l'itle of Court and Cause) 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
ON PLAINTIFF'S ORDER T 0 SH 0 W 
CAUSE WHY THE DEFENDANT SHOULD 
NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT AND DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION TO AMEND DI-
VORCE DECREE RESPECTING ALIMONY 
PAYMENTS, HELD BEFORE THE HONOR-
ABLE GORDON R. HALL, A JUDGE OF 
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, ON THE lST 
DAY OF OCTOBER, 1970. 
227 The case for hearing before the court was Case Num-
ber 171633, LEE C. FELT, Plaintiff, vs. ROBERT S. 
FELT Defendant. Mr. Thomas M. Burton represented 
' 
the plaintiff, and Mr. Gayle Dean Hunt acted as counsel 
for the defendant. 
39 
OPENING STATEMENTS 
Mr. Hunt stated that he intended for the hearing to 
be a broad examination into the file back to and including 
the Divorce Decree and Property Settlement Agreement. 
He said that he did not intend the court to be confined 
to the matter of whether there had been a change of cir-
cumstances on the part of either party, but intended and 
hoped to show that the decree itself prescribed an un-
reasonable burden on the defendant and was basically 
unfair and founded upon erroneous premises that should 
be examined. Mr. Burton objected to the scope of Mr. 
Hunt's statement on the grounds of irrelevancy and im-
materiality and of res judicata. He argued that the de-
cree on its face was signed by Dr. Felt and was approved 
by the court as to its form and fairness, both in the Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and in the decree 
itself. The objection was specifically directed to any 
228 attempt to broaden the preceding into an inquiry into the 
basic fairness of the Divorce Decree itself. 
In response to a question by the court, Mr. Hunt an-
swered that there was originally a written stipulation 
of the parties termed "Property Settlelment Agreemt>nt" 
upon which the Divorce Decree was based. The conrt 
227 indicated it was not going to unnecessarily restrict Mr. 
Hunt in the proceeding. It was admitted by the conrt that 
it had some reservations about whether the scope of the 
hearing could be as broad as indicated in Mr. Hunt's 
opening remarks since there vvas a written stipulation in 
the matter which had been adopted and approved by the 
court. 
40 
The plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, was examined directly by 
233 Mr. Burton and cross-examined by Mr. Hunt on matters 
pertaining to the plaintiff's Order to Show Cause Why 
the Defendant Should Not be held in Contempt. Robert 
234 S. Felt, the defendant, and Marge Kiddle were directly 
examined by Mr. Burton in regard to the same issue. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF LEE CRAIG FELT 
BY MR. HUNT 
283 The plaintiff testified that she was presently single 
and employed full time by Circuit & Eddington Adver-
tising. Mr. Hunt asked plaintiff her present salary and 
Mr. Burton objected on the grounds of irrelevancy. He 
declared that the plaintiff and defendant had agreed to 
the Property Settlelment Agreement which had been 
adopted and incorporated into the Divorce Decree. Said 
agreement provided that no change in Mrs. Felt's income 
or circumstances would have any bearing on the obliga-
tion of the defendant to make alimony payments. The 
court ref erred to the Property Settlement Agreement 
mentioned by Mr. Burton which allowed the plaintiff's 
284 income to fluctuate without affecting defendant's obliga-
tion. Discussion between Mr. Hunt, Mr. Burton and the 
court followed as to whether an inquiry into the plain-
tiff's salary was proper. Mr. Hunt argued that Judge 
Wilkins had permitted discovery of the plaintiff's salary 
and Mr. Burton contended that although discovery may 
have been permitted, that did not necessarily mean the 
information obtained therefrom could be admitted as 
285 evidence. Mr. Hunt asserted that the Utah Supreme 
Court case of Callister v. Callister and others permitted 
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the court to increase or decrease alimony payments upon 
a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. Mr. 
286 Burton countered by stating that the cases did not 
apply where a Decree and Property Settlement Agree-
ment had been entered into in contemplation of the wife's 
future employment. At the time of this hearing, the 
transcript of the divorce proceeding before Judge Wil-
kins had been lost by the reporter in the move from the 
old courthouse building to the new. Efforts were being 
287 made to locate the same and have the reporter's notes 
transcribed. The court overruled Mr. Burton's objection 
and allowed Mr. Hunt to proceed with his examination. 
Mrs. Felt stated that at the time of the divorce in 
the Spring of 1967, she was employed part-time doing 
free lance talent work. At the date of the present hearing, 
she was employed full time by Circuit & Eddington at a 
salary of approximately $8,400.00 per year. In addition 
to her full time employment, Mrs. Felt engaged in some 
part-time free lance work and had done so for the past 
year. Furthermore, Mrs. Felt occasionally read a corn-
288 mercial for radio station KSXX which resulted in some 
income. Her income from stocks and bonds amounted to 
$100.00 a year or less. 
289 Mrs. Felt declared that she possessed a l\faster's De-
gree and Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University 
and had extensive training in the radio and TV field. She 
further stated that she was able to earn a livelihood and 
was trying hard to earn enough money to secure her 
290 future and, therefore had chosen to work. The plaintiff 
responded that she was in good health for a -..voman of 
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age 431/2 and had been able to hold a good skilled job. 
She expressed a concern that her employment may not 
be secure in the future in view of the fact that her em-
ployer had recently hired a number of young people and 
had put an emphasis on young people with new ideas. 
291 No dependents were reported by Mrs. Felt on her 
income tax returns. In addition to her salary, her em-
ployer furnished some medical coverage by paying one-
half the cost of Blue Cross-Blue Shield Medical Insur-
ance. The employer also provided two weeks of paid 
292 vacation and furnished a membership in the Advertising 
Club. Mrs. Felt owned her own furniture and was pur-
chasing an annuity from the Pollack Fund. Mrs. Felt 
stated that she had savings account, various charge and 
293 credit accounts, that her clothing costs approximated 
$800.00 a year, that her apartment rental was $178.00 a 
month, that she spent round $110.00 a month for food, 
294 that her utilities were paid, that she spent $35.00 a month 
on life insurance, spent $5.00 to $10.00 a month for recre-
ation, $3.00 a month for membership in the American 
Women Radio and Television Society, and incurred medi-
295 cal and dental expenses of $25.00 per month. She admit-
ted the she was not really living high in view of her per-
sonal living expenses. 
296 The plaintiff's 1968 Income Tax Return showed in-
come from wages and salaries of $8,091.00 and other in-
come of $12,078.00, which included the $1,000.00 a month 
alimony payments received from her husband. Her total 
income for the year 1968 before taxes amounted to $20,-
968.00. 
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297 Mrs. Felt's 1969 Income Tax Return showed a total 
income of $17,168.00 with an adjustment of $1,800.00, leav-
ing an adjuS'ted gross income of $15,000.00. During the 
year 1969, Dr. Felt had paid only part of his alimony obli-
gation. It was admitted that without any alimony from 
Dr. Felt, Mrs. Felt would earn in the neighborhood of 
$8,500.00 or $8,600.00 a year. Mr. Burton again objected 
to the line of questioning concerning the plaintiff's in-
298 come and expenses, which objection was overruled by the 
court. 
The only borrowing engaged in by Mrs. Felt was 
borrowing on her Walker Bank Card. No vacations had 
been taken by the plaintiff although she had made several 
299 trips in connection with work to Las Vegas, Michigan, 
Arizona and Los Angeles, plus a week-end conference 
300 in Denver. Mr. Hunt questioned the plaintiff whether 
she chose to work voluntarily, to which she responded, 
"yes," that she worked at her particular job to earn a 
living. She stated that if she had no financial stress to 
consider, she would quit her current job and find one 
301 
she liked better and only work part-time. It was further 
stated bv Mrs. Felt that she did not have any savings . . 
and did not have the same opportunity to increase her 
earnings she would have if younger. Therefore, she chose 
to work to provide for some kind of security in the evE'nt 
of an accident or unemployment for some period of time. 
302 Mrs. Felt further stated that she desired to provide 
for her own retirement and, therefore, wanted to work as 
hard as she could to try and earn something for retire-
ment vears and to provide for herself in the case of sick-
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303 ness. She admitted that at present she was in vigorous 
health, fully employed and capable of earning a living 
from day to day if nothing went wrong. Plaintiff de-
clared that she did not want to eliminate the alimony 
payments until such time as she was sick or unemployed, 
because at such time Dr. Felt may also be sick or un-
employed. She did not feel that the $1,000.00 a month 
which had been agreed upon by her husband and herself 
was unreasonable or unfair in light of his earnings and 
304 the after tax cost of making such payments. It was stated 
Mrs. Felt did not like to receive alimony and wished that 
she did not have to, but that such alimony payments were 
accepted because she needed the money to pro'Vi.de for her 
future. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
305 The plaintiff testified that she married Dr. Felt in 
December of 1949 and that at the time of said marriage 
she was employed part-time and completing college. Fol-
lo,ving Dr. Felt's graduation from Medical School, he 
went to Detroit, Michigan for his internship. Mrs. Felt 
stayed in Salt Lake City for three months and worked 
at two full time jobs. At the end of three months she 
joined her husband in Detroit for the remaining period 
of his internship and was employed full time in Detroit, 
Michigan. 
306 Upon completion of the internship, the plaintiff and 
the defendant moved to Denver, Colorado, where Dr. Felt 
completed his residency period of three years training. 
During the three year residency in Colorado, Mrs. Felt 
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was employed full time, being a teacher at the Colorado 
Women's College, a Secretary to the Dean of Women for 
a year, and then the Continuity Director for KFEL TV. 
Mrs. Felt earned an amount of salary equal to or in ex-
cess of the money earned by Dr. Felt during the period 
of internship and residency. 
307 Upon completion of his residency, Dr. Felt entered 
the Armed Forces for a period of two years. During 
said period, Mrs. Felt did not work. After completion of 
his service time, Dr. Felt and the plaintiff moved to Salt 
Lake City where Dr. Felt was employed in his specialty. 
Mrs. Felt worked full time for approximatelty 211z years 
after they returned to Salt Lake City and was employed 
part-time for another seven years. Mrs. Felt testified 
that she worked until approximately the time of the di-
vorce. She further said that at the time of the divorce 
she contemplated returning to full time employment 
thereafter. No discussions were had between Dr. and 
Mrs. Felt after she left home in 1967 regarding employ-
ment but Mrs. Felt again returned to full time employ-
ment about four months later. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
325 Mrs. Felt was asked whether the work pattern that 
she had followed existed before the time of the divorce, 
to which she answered yes. She further testified that at 
the time of her marriage to Dr. Felt, he was within one 
quarter of graduating from Medical School. Dr. Felt had 
not, hovveyer, completed his internship or residency. 
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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF ROBERTS. FELT 
BY MR. HUNT 
3~4 The defendant was questioned concerning his income 
325 during the period of internship and residency and asked 
why he signed the Property Settlement Agreement which 
provided that the alimony payments were being made "in 
view of the efforts made by plaintiff in assistance of de-
fendant in his professional education." Mr. Burton ob-
jected to the question on the grounds that the question 
was entering the area of impeaching the court's divorce 
decree which had been agreed to, read, understood and 
326 approved by the defendant, his counsel, and the court. 
He stated that said agreement had been incorporated into 
the decree and was part and parcel of the decree. Mr. 
Burton further argued that he had previously stated 
his objection to the defendant's attempt to go behind the 
face of the decree and impeach it by saying he didn't 
understand the terms or that he was under duress. The 
court indicated that it intended to be flexible about this 
matter. The court stated that it fully apprecitaed Mr. 
Burton's position and admitted that he may very well 
be right, however, his objection was overruled without 
prejudice and Mr. Hunt was allowed to continue. 
In response to Mr. Hunt's question, Dr. Felt testified 
that the reason he signed the Property Settlelment Agree-
327 ment was he was under such mental and physical duress 
that he did not contest the agreement as being in fact the 
best that his counsel could secure. Defendant stated that 
he questioned the alimony payment provision of the 
agreement along with other provisions but was told by 
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his counsel that this was proper and that he should sign 
it. The Property Settlement Agreement was signed by 
Dr. Felt at his home ·with only his counsel present. He 
declared that he had never seen the agreement prior to 
the time that he signed it and that he spent only approxi-
329 mately ten minutes in reviewing said agreement. Defend-
ant commented that he executed the agreemt>nt the first 
and only time that he saw it. 
Defendant declared that m his opm10n it was im-
possible to maintain the alimony paymPnts of $1,000.00 
per month because his circumstances had changed con-
siderably and that he had rmiarried. He stated that he 
330 managed to maintain the alimony payments as long as 
he could during 1968 but it became physically and mental-
ly impossible to maintain the burden on himself or his 
patients. The overhead costs and business costs asso-
ciated with his practice were stated to be on the inflation-
ary rise although his fee structure had remained the same. 
In the latter part of 1967 and the early part of 1968, Dr. 
Felt said he was forced to rnsh through more people, 
work long and demanding hours and undertake a heavier 
surgical schedule in order to meet the alimony payments. 
331 Because of the increased work load, Dr. Felt claimed to 
have become increasingly tired ph)'Sically and to have 
developed some neurological problems. He consulted 
doctors concerning the neurological problems and was 
told that he should cut down on his work. Dr. Felt fur-
333 ther stated that he thought it was professionally in-
advisable to undertake tlH• work load he had in 19GS and 
1969. 
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Dr. Felt next testified concerning changes which had 
33() occurred in his income and expenses for the· years 1967, 
337 1968, and 1968. Defendant's Exhibit 14-D was admitted 
into evidence and the defendant was questioned as to the 
information thereon. Said exhibit consisted of an account-
ing breakdown of the income and expenses for Dr. Felt 
during the years 1967 through 1969. Said exhibit showed 
gross income from medical practice of $70,108.00 in 1967, 
$72,481.00 in 1968, and $67,648.00 in 1969. The expenses 
for the corresponding years were $38,973.00, $38,490.00, 
and $43,213.00. Adjusted gross income before taxes, 
alimony payments and interest on a house loan was $34,-
040.00 in 1967, $38,186.00 in 1968, and $28,014.00 in 1969. 
The net income figures listed in said Exhibit 14-D re-
vealed net income in 1967 of $17,317.00, in 1968 of $17,-
573.00 and in 1969 of $14,395.00. 
Defendant's Exhibit 15-D consisted of a graph show-
ing defendant's net income after disbursements and ali-
mony for the years 1966 through 1969. Said exhibit was 
admitted over Mr. Burton's objection that the informa-
tion was already before the court and that the manner 
338 of graphing the information may be exaggerated. Exhibit 
16-D was also admitted over Mr. Burton's objection. Said 
exhibit illustrated defendant's gross overhead costs ex-
cluding alimony for the years 1964 through 1969. As 
graphed, the exhibit indicated an increase in gross over-
340 head costs from $19,500.00 in 1964, to $49,000.00 in 1969. 
Exhibit 17-D was admitted into evidence, said exhibit 
purporting to show the costs of post-graduate meetings, 
seminars and conventions and the number attended by 
Dr. Felt each year. Said graph indicated that Dr. Felt 
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attended approximtaely five to six such seminars per 
year and that the cost had increased somevvhat over the 
345 years. Dr. Felt then commented upon the increase in per-
sonal living expenses he had experienced since 1967. The 
court took judicial notice of the fact that the cost of living 
348 has increased during the past years. Exhibit 22-D was ad-
mitted to evidence over plaintiff's objection, said exhibit 
indicating that the estimated living expenses of Dr. Felt 
were $1,604.44 per month. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
351 Dr. Felt admitted that during the period of his resi-
dency and internship Mrs. Felt was employed and the 
money she earned was not placed in a separate fund hut 
that all earnings were kept in the kitty and both lived off 
the mone.'r in the kitty. The defendant also stated that at 
353 the time he married his present wife, Mrs. Verla Felt, 
that he was fully aware of the obligation he had agreed 
to perfonn of paying $1,000.00 per month to l\frs. Lee C. 
Felt as alimony. 
363 Mr. Burton questioned the defendant in regard to 
the expenses for attending conventions over the years 
364 1967 through 1969. The graph admitted to evidence as 
Exhibit 17-D, showed a drop in the expenditures for con-
vention attendance in the vPar 19()7 although the total 
number of meetings attended each year remained about 
the same. Dr. Felt stated that the drop in Pxpenditnres 
may be attributable to the conventions themselves costing 
366 less or being held closer to Salt Lake City. Mr. Burton 
next questioned Dr. Felt regarding the breakdown in ex-
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J68 penses listed on Exhibit 14-D. One of the expenses listed 
as a decduction from gross income was ref erred to as 
Keogh. In 1967 there was no deduction, in 1968 $1,500.00 
was deducted, and in 1969 $2,500.00 was deducted from 
gross income. Dr. Felt admitted that the Keogh account 
369 is to provide for his retirement and that in effect he was 
paying himself an amount for later use. Under such cir-
cumstances, the defendant admitted he did not know 
whether the Keogh contributions were a proper deduc-
tion from gross income. 
It was admitted by the defendant that the plaintiff 
had been employed off and on full and sometimes part-
time during the entire years of their marriage. He stated 
that he assumed she worked because she enjoyed it and 
that even after he was established as a specialist in Salt 
Lake City, she still worked occasionally. Dr. Felt com-
370 mented that he didn't know whether the plaintiff anti-
cipated working after the divorce. He stated that he never 
specifically discussed this with the plaintiff and did not 
recall discussing it with his counsel. 
371 Defendant admitted signing the Property Settlement 
Agreement which was incorporated into the divorce de-
cree on May 17, 1967. At the time of his signing said 
Property Settlement Agreement, Mr. Grant Aadnesen 
was declared to be his counsel of his own free choosing. 
Said counsel had not been suggested to Dr. Felt by the 
372 plaintiff or any person connected with her. Defendant 
further responded that to his knowledge his counsel had 
held several discussions with counsel representing plain-
tiff. He then admitted that he had discussions on more 
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than one occasion with Mr. Aadnesen, his counsel, con-
cerning conversations which Mr. Aadnesen had had with 
plaintiff's counsel. 
The defendant declared that he received phone calls 
from his counsel with reference to possible settlement 
aspects of the case. He testified that he couldn't recall 
the exact conversations regarding settlement, only that 
when settlement had been reached he was notified by Mr. 
Aadnesen that he would be up to the house to show him 
the settlement. Concerning the amount of alimony, Dr. 
Felt admitted the only amount of alimony ever discussed 
was $1,000.00 per month. 
Mr. Burton referred to paragraph one of defendant's 
affidavit which had been filed with the court in support 
of his motion to amend the divorce decree. Said affidavit 
set forth as a ground for modification that defendant 
had been prevailed upon by plaintiff and counsel, both 
hers and his, and urged to consent to an alimony decision 
which he was persuaded he could maintain and that was 
fair under the circumstances. Mr. Burton asked the de-
fendant what he meant by prevailed upon, to which 
he replied he was approached by Mr. Aadnesen after Mr. 
373 Aadnesen had held discussions with plaintiff's counsel 
concerning the possibility of settlement. The defendant 
stated that hy prevailed upon he meant that he was re-
quested to consent to the details of the Property SettlP-
ment Agreement which he signed. It was admitted that 
the request made by Mr. Aadnesen was that the details 
were finally to be worked out, the document had been 
dictated and transcribed in his office, was ready for 
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signature, and that defendant should look it over and sign 
it. 
In response to the question of whether he discussed 
the terms and provisions of the decree with his counsel, 
Dr. Felt replied that he went through it as he had indi-
cated in earlier testimony and questioned some of the 
items. He said he questioned the alimony item as being 
over generous. Mr. Aadnesen, his counsel, purportedly 
said that any Third District Court Judge would agree 
that this was fair and equitable and that he thought it was 
too. Therefore, Dr. Felt claimed he relied upon coun-
sel's advice because he had to, meaning that when he 
questioned the alimony provision the answer was that 
any other judge would have done the same. The defendant 
admitted that he was not prevented from obtaining other 
counsel at that time but that it had never occurred to him 
to do so. He also stated that he could have sought other 
advice to see if Mr. Aadnesen 's representation concerning 
the alimony payment was correct but he didn't. 
Mr. Burton asked whether defendant and his counsel 
had discussed the possibility of the alimony amount being 
greater in the event of a trial. Dr. Felt commented that 
he asked his counsel whether he was to appear, if there 
was going to be a judge and jury, and how this thing is 
going to operate. Mr. Aadnesen allegedly replied that 
in cases of this type ordinarily the attorne,ys draw up the 
agreements between themselves and if they are satis-
factory to their individual clients it is carried no further. 
Defendant also said he questioned the propriety of the 
plaintiff being immune from the court reviewing the ali-
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mony from time to time and that Mr. Aadnesen stated 
that this is the way we handle it. It was admitted by de-
fendant, however, that plaintiff was not immune, that if 
his income went down she was not immune under the 
terms of the agreement from having the alimony reducPd. 
375 He also responded that if plaintiff's income \Vas reduced 
the court would look at the decree and if his income in-
creased the plaintiff had no right to have the alimony 
adjusted upward. 
376 
The following exchange then occurred between Mr. 
Burton and defendant: 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
vVell, at any rate, you discussed this alimony 
provision with him, and at the conclusion of 
your discussion you signed the agreement 1 
Yes. 
And you didn't in any way, suggest that ~-011 
weren't a free agent, that you were compelled 
to do it in this way1 
No. 
So you really weren't prevailed upon in any 
manner to sign this agreement rather tl1an 
not to sign it? 
OnlY to the extent that that \vas the best W(' 
couid do, therefore, ergo, write your name. 
The answer was always the same, well, there 
it is. 
This was the settlement, that was the brst 
settlement that could be made under the cir-
cumstances, what he represented to yon? 
Anybody else sitting on the bench, it was the 
same thing. 
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Q. You had discussed, I take it, with your counsel 
the facts and circumstances of all conduct 
involving you, your wife, and all the mani-
festations of that conduct~ 
A. To a degree. 
Q. I see. And this agreement was all part of that 
discussion in regard to the divorce wasn't it? 
A. Yes. 
'l'he defendant was then questioned concerning the 
allegation in his affidavit that he was prevailed upon to 
sign the Property Settlement Agreement. Reference was 
made to page 4, line 3 of defendant's deposition, where 
he was asked what he meant by the statement that he was 
prevailed upon by plaintiff and her counsel in regard to 
the Property Settlement Agreement. The defendant 
admitted in his deposition that he hadn't had any contact 
with the plaintiff or her counsel except in conversations 
through his counsel. Again, in court, the defendant ad-
mitted that he never had any discussion with Mrs. Felt 
after the divorce was filed or with the lawyers repre-
senting her. Referring to the deposition of defendant, 
Mr. Burton next requested defendant to refer to page 5, 
line 2, where he was asked what he meant by the state-
ment in his affidavit that he was prevailed upon by 
plaintiff and her counsel in connection with the decree. 
Dr. Felt read his answer as it appeared in the deposition 
which stated, "Since the language is not my own, I am 
going to have to pass because I didn't write this." 
Defendant next testfied concerning his present health 
conditions which he claimed made it impossible for him 
to maintain the alimony payments. The specific health 
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378 problem was stated to be a depression syndrome rnsulting 
in a partial paralysis of the right shoulder. The physical 
abnormality was determined to be a verticulus of one of 
the roots stemming out of the neck. No particular injury 
or trauma could be isolated as the cause of the problem. 
The physicians consulted by Dr. Felt were of the opinion 
that he should curtail his work load and physical activity 
in an effort to relieye the problem. Dr. Felt further ad-
379 mitted that the problem was not a question of emotion 
but there was a physical lesion to which the syndrome 
was related. It was furhter established that the syndrome 
had subsided and that the defendant had no further 
problems of any sort with reference to it. Dr. Felt did 
state that his Doctors felt that the same problem could 
occur again at any time and that he should avoid any 
strenuous physical activity which ma~- cause the disc in 
his neck to slip again. In spite of this recommendation by 
380 the doctors, Dr. Felt continued to ski regularly during 
the year, his justification being that he had to weigh 
the risk of aggravating the health condition with the risk 
of sitting around and becoming fat and degenerated. 
382 The defendant was questioned rt>garding his mental 
health and he commented that there was nothing presently 
wrong with his mental health. At one time he had con-
sulted a psychiatrist but tht> prohlE>m had been cleared 
up. 
REDIRECT l!JXAMINATION 
387 The defendant testified that the reason for his steril-
ization was because of hereditary muscular dystrophy in 
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SS his ancestry. Sterilization was accomplished about a week 
or two after he married the plaintiff, Mrs. Lee Felt. He 
declared that he discussed the matter of sterilization 
with the plaintiff, that she was in favor of it and helped 
him make the decision. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
94 Defendant testified that during the five years of his 
residency and internship that Mrs. Felt's salary contri-
buted to the overall treasury. He admitted that her salary 
was in excess of his while they were in Denver for his 
residency. After Dr. Felt was discharged from the Air 
Force he came to Salt Lake City to establish his practice. 
95 During the first year to 2¥2 years of practice he admitted 
that there were various expenses for the purchase of 
equipment and to establish himself in business. The 
plaintiff was employed full time throughout this period 
of time. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION OF LEE CRAIG FELT 
BY MR. BURTON 
04 Mrs. Felt testified that in spite of her present aca-
demic qualifications, she was unable to secure a teaching 
position because she did not have a teaching certificate. 
To acquire such a certficate would require her to quit 
work and return to school. The plaintiff further re-
sponded that she would like to change from her present 
05 job because of the pressure that she must work under. 
Her employer required that for each 15 minute segment 
of her time, the plaintiff account for something she has 
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406 produced which is billable to a client. Mrs. Felt admitted 
that she held an executive position with her employer and 
that she had seen other younger persons hired after her. 
Many of the persons hired subsequent to .Mrs. Felt were 
407 employed at a greater compensation, especially in the 
case of men. She did not feel that a woman had the same 
chance to become a Vice-President for her employer and 
make the same money as a man. .Mrs. Felt said that she 
had not actually sought other employment in Salt Lake 
City because her salary was commensurate with what a 
person could make at her job. She responded that she 
had considered seeking employment in other cities but 
that she could not afford to take the time off to travel 
to other cities in search of a job. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
409 During the time of Mrs. Felt's employment while 
married to the defendant, there were no dependents in 
their home. She admitted that the cost of Dr. Felt's 
attending :Medical School was paid for by his parents. 
Also, Dr. Felt's parents assisted plaintiff and defendant 
in the purchase of a duplex in which they resided during 
their residency in Denver. Dr. Felt's parents further pro-
vided plaintiff and defendant with an automobile during 
their residency. 
410- Mrs. Verla Felt, the defendant's present wife, and 
441 Mrs. Olive S. Felt, the defendant's mother, were examined 
about matters pertaining to the contempt issue which was 
before the court. 
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ARGUMENTS OF COUNSEL 
~1 Following presentation of the foregoing testimony, 
the plaintiff and defendant rested their cases. Thereupon, 
the court instructed Mr. Burton to proceed with his 
argument which shonld include both the question of con-
tempt which was before the court and the question of 
amending the divorce decree. Mr. Burton asserted that 
under the doctrine of clean hands the defendant was not 
entitled to proceed with the modification of the divorce 
decree until the arrearage was made up. Mr. Hunt re-
quested to see the law on that voint. The court stated 
that it had opened the matter up and let it be fully aired 
to the satisfaction of both parties. Therefore, the court 
had suggested that the arguments go to both matters if 
that met with the approval of counsel. Mr. Hunt then 
l42 requested that the arguments ought to be reported be-
cause he felt they would have a bearing if the court was 
going to explore what is an appropriate alimony in modi-
fying the decree. He asserted that it was inappropriate to 
confine the inquiry to the economic proceedings and con-
ditions of the respective status of the parties. 
!42- Mr. Burton then reviewed the testimony which had 
i60 been given at the proceeding and argued that the facts 
elicited supported the plaintiff's position that the defend-
ant was in contempt and that the divorce decree should 
not be amended. Numerous cases were cited by Mr. Bur-
ton in support of his contentions that employment of the 
plaintiff was not a sufficient change in circumstances to 
warrant modification of the decree. It was also asserted 
that there had been no change in the defendant's circum-
stances sufficient to require modification of the decree. 
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460- Mr. Hunt responded by contending that there had 
467 been a change in circumstances and that the alimony pro-
vision of the divorce decree should be changed. He was 
of the opinion that the decree was unfair and that the 
agreement should be re-examined and the alimony re-
duced. He asserted that the divorce decree and Property 
Settlement Agreement came very close to being a fraud 
on the court. Mr. Hunt cited various cases in support of 
his arguments and referred to testimony which he felt 
supported his theories. 
At the conclusion of the arguments of counsel the 
case was submitted to the court, at which time the matter 
was taken under advisement. 
HAL M. ·w ALTON 
Third Judicial District Court 
Official Court Reporter 
Duly certified March 6, 1971. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
185 Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in re Contempt, and 
Defendant's Motion for Modification of Decree came on 
for hearing on October 1, 1970, and not being completed 
on that day were again heard on October 2 and October 
5, 1970, the plaintiff appearing in person and hy c~nnsel, 
Thomas M. Burton, and the defendant appearing m per-
son and by counsel, Gayle Dean Hunt. 
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'rl1e matter having bt-en fully presented, argued and 
submitted and the Court now being fully advised in the 
premises finds and concludes as follows: 
1. That the defendant is in contempt of the Court's 
prior alimony order as set forth in the Decree of Divorce, 
said order having been based on a stipulation of the par-
ties. The contempt is based on defendant's failure and 
refusal to pay the designated amounts, wh(m he at all 
times had sufficient earnings to do so. Further, defend-
ant has made transfers of property without consideration 
and held large sums of cash to defeat plaintiff's efforts 
to execute on prior judgments obtained for delinquent 
alimony. 
2. That the plaintiff is well qualified both from the 
standpoint of formal education and years of experience 
in her chosen field of endeavor to earn sufficient funds to 
adequately maintain herself. This was demonstrated 
throughout the time of the marriage and is particularly 
true now that she has again taken full-time employment, 
her employment at the time of the Decree having been 
only part-time. 
86 3. That the agreement of the parties and the subse-
quent award of alimony was based in part on the recogni-
tion of plaintiff's efforts to assist defendant in obtaining 
his medical education and the Court find that her efforts 
were substantial in this regard since defendant's intern-
ship and residency years are deemed to be just as import-
ant to his over-all education as the more formal education 
obtained while in medical school. 
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4. That the plaintiff is reasonably entitled to ali-
mony for a given period of time sufficient to permit her 
to properly adjust to single life; however, to allow per-
manent alimony in the amount provided for in the Decree 
is unjust, unnecessary, and not equitable and the Decree 
lt 
is consequently modified to provide for the payment of 
said amounts of alimony through the month of May, 1971, 
a period of four years in all, said payments to cease there-
after, except for the payment of the nominal sum of $1.00 
per year necessary to preserve the right of plaintiff to 
future assistance should a true need arise. 
5. That the defendant is sentenced to ten (10) days 
in the County Jail as punishment for his contempt; how-
ever, a stay of execution is entered and he is given an 
opportunity to purge himself of said contempt by making 
all future payments of alimon~- promptly when dur, and 
provided further, that he make immediate arrangements 
to pay all of the alimony arrearage due to plaintiff, in-
cluding the amounts thereof represented b~- judgments 
obtained. 
G. The plaintiff is restrained from levying execution 
on any and all of defendant's property so long as he 
abides by the conditions set forth in paragraph 5 aboYe. 
7. That plaintiff is awarded attorney fees in the 
amount of $250.00 in connection with the contempt matter. 
Dated this 5th day of November, 1970. 
GORDON R. HALL, JUDGE 
Duly attested and filed November 5, 1970. 
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(Title of Court and Cause) 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL AND TO AMEND 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
:7 The plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, by her counsel Thomas M. 
Burton and pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, hereby moves the above-entitled Court 
for a new trial only on the issue of the modification of 
this Court's Decree, on the ground of newly discovered 
evidence material to plaintiff's position in the case, which 
she could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at trial, and to amend its Memorandum 
Decision dated November 5, 1970, by vacating its finding 
and conclusion that that certain Property Settlement 
Agreement executed by the parties on May 16, 1967 and 
approved by the Court on May 17, 1967, was unjust, and 
by vacating its order reducing the alimony provision 
therein contained to $1.00 a year as of May 1971 and by 
denying in its entirety defendant's motion to modify decree 
herein. This Motion is made upon the further ground that 
one of the issues before this Court in the October 1, 1970 
trial was the basis upon which this Court heretofore en-
tered its default judgment and approved the aforesaid 
Property Settlement Agreement as fair and reasonable. 
The reporter's notes of the default proceedings were 
ordered transcribed by D. Frank Wilkins, Judge, pur-
suant to one of plaintiff's previous motions for an Order 
to Show Cause, but could not, at that time, be located by 
lS the Clerk's office·. Subsequent to the said October 1, 1970 
trial of plaintiff's motion to hold defendant in contempt 
and defendant's motion to amend decree, the reporter's 
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notes of the May 17, 1967 default proceedings were found 
have been transcribed and the transcript is filed herewith' 
Said motion is further based upon the affidavit 0~ 
Thomas M. Burton attached hereto and by this reference 
incorporated herein. 
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1970. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNvV ALL & McCARrrHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Duly verified and filed December 3, 1970. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW 
TRIAL AND TO AMEND MEMORANDUM 
DECISION, HELD BEFORE THE HONOR-
ABLE GORDON R. HALL, A JUDGE OF 
THE THIRD .JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, ON THE 18th 
DAY OF .JANUARY, 1971 
468 The record showed that the respective counsel for 
Lee C. Felt, the plaintiff, and Rob<•rt S. Felt, the defend-
ant, were present in court. Mr. Burton first presented 
his arguments as to wh~- a nPw trial should be granted 
and the court's previous Memorandum Decision modified. 
The first reason advanced for the granting of plain-
tiff's motion was that the isslw of modification of the 
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divorce decree was not timely heard. ~fr. Burton con-
tended that defendant's motion to have the decree modi-
fied should not have been heard until the arrearage in 
alimony payments was cured through payment by de-
fendant to plaintiff. 
The second ground for granting plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial advanced by Mr. Burton was that the 
agre«ment entered into between the parties and incorpo-
rated into the divorce decree providing for payment by 
defendant to plaintiff of $1,000.00 a month was in essence 
a Property Settlement Agreement and not an agreement 
providing for the payment of alimony. Therefore, the 
)9 court was without authority to modify said agreement. 
The third ground for granting the plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial advanced by Mr. Burton was that the 
newly discovered reporter's transcript of the divorce 
proceeding would make it clear that the parties and the 
court anticipated that the plaintiff would seek full time 
employment following the granting of the divorce. There-
fore, the plaintiff's subsequent full time employment is 
not a change of circumstances which merits modification 
of alimony in the decree. 
:il The final argument asserted by Mr. Burton was that 
there was no basis for the court's finding that the original 
divorce decree was unreasonable since both parties were 
represented by counsel and that the court sp€cifically 
found at the time of the default proceeding that the de-
l'ree was reasonable. 
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Mr. Hunt argued that the transcript of the original 
divorce hearing added nothing to the matters before the 
court. He argued that the welfare of the parties involved 
impelled a change and that the court had jurisdiction to .93 
make a change in the alimony arrangement. He con-
tended that the court had continuing jurisdiction in the 
matter of modifying the alimony payment set out in the 
472 decree. Mr. Burto11 then submitted the Utah Supreme 
Court case of Allen v. Allen, 475 P.2d 1021, in support 
of his arguments. Mr. Hnnt and Mr. Burton thereafter 
submitted the matter to the conrt. The court commented 
that in regards to Mr. Burton's final argument that the 
court in rendering its decision for defendant did not in-
tend to imply that the prior decision rendered by the 
court in the divorce hearing was unjust or inequitable. 
The court stated that by reason of a change in circnm-
stances, the conrt has found that the decree has becomP 
unjust and unreasonable and that it didn't imply that 
such decree was ever unjust or inequitable at the time it 
was first entered. Citation of the Allen case was acknowl-
edged by the court but distinguished on the basis that 
the facts and circumstances were not the same as the 
matter before the court. The plaintiff's motion for a 
new trial and to amend the Memorandum Decision "-as 
then denied. 
HAL M. WALTON 
Official Conrt Reporter 
Third Judicial District Court 
Duly Certified March G, 1971. FilPd March 30, 1971. 
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(Title of Court and Cause) 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
J 93 The above case was scheduled for hearing and heard 
January 8th and January 18, 1971, on plaintiff's Motion 
for New Trial, plaintiff being represented by counsel, 
Thomas M. Burton, and defendant by counsel, Gayle Dean 
Hunt, whereupon arguments of counsel were heard and 
the Court being fully advised in the premises and having 
determined that said Motion for New Trial should be 
denied, NOW, THEREFORE, 
IT IS HE.RE.BY ORDERED, that the Motion for 
New Trial of plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, herein be, and the 
same is hereby denied. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1971. 
GORDONR. HALL, JUDGE 
Duly attested and filed February 2, 1971. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
ORDER MODIFYING DIVORCE DECREE 
AND RESPECTING CONTEMPT 
207 The above case was scheduled for hearing and was 
heard October 1, 2, and 5, 1970, before the Hon. Gordon 
R. Hall, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court on 
plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in re Contempt and on 
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defendant's Motion for Modification of Divorce Deere€ 
I 
plaintiff appearing in person and by her counsel, Thoma~ 
M. Burton, and defendant appearing in person and by 
his attorney, Gayle Dean Hunt. Testimony was taken 
evidence introduced and arguments heard and the Court 08 
being fully advised in the premises and having made and 
entered herein its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED as follows: 
1. Defendant is ordered to make future payments 
of alimony as required in this Order, promptly when due. 
2. That defendant is hereby ordered to pay $250.00 
to plaintiff for attorney's fees. 
3. That the Divorce Decree herein is modified as 
follows: monthly alimony payments are provided for in 
the Divorce Decree herein shall be paid by defendant to 
plaintiff through the month of May, 1971, a period of four 
years in all, said payments to cease thereafkr, exc<'pt for 
the payment of a nominal snm of $1.00 per year necessary 
to preserve the right of plaintiff to fnture assistancP 
should a trne need arise. 
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1971. 
GORDON R. HALL, Judge 
Duly atteskd and filed February 2, 1971. 
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(Title of Court and Cause) 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
S 'rhe above case was scheduled for hearing and was 
heard October 1, 2, and 5, 1970, before the Hon. Gordon 
R. Hall, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court on 
plaintiff's Order to Show Cause in re Contempt and on 
defendant's Motion for Modification of Divorce Decree, 
plaintiff appearing in person and by her counsel, Thomas 
M. Burton, and defendant appearing in person and by 
his attorney, Gayle Dean Hunt. Testimony was taken, 
evidence introduced and arguments heard and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises now makes the fol-
lowing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That the defendant is in contempt of the Court's 
prior alimony order as set forth in the Decree of Divorce, 
said order having been based on a stipulation of the 
parties. The contempt is based on defendant's failure and 
refusal to pay the designated amounts, when he at all 
times had sufficient earnings to do so. Further, defendant 
has made transfers of property without consideration 
and held large sums of cash to def eat plaintiff's efforts 
to execute on prior judgments obtained for delinquent 
alimony. 
2. The court made a memorandum decision herein 
dated November 5, 1970, indicating that defendant be 
sentenced to ten days in jail for contempt, a stay of exe-
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cution to be entered and defendant given an opportunity 
to purge himself of said contempt by payment of futnr~ 
payments of alimony as ordered, thereby, and of arrear-
ages including sums represented by judgments then due. 
3. Between that time and the present time, defend-
209 ant has paid said arrearages and current sums owing 
and has therefore, purged himself of said contempt sub-
ject only to said order as it relates to future payments 
required thereby. 
4. Plaintiff has been required to engage an attorney 
to prosecute her petition herein. 
5. A reasonable fee for the services of said attornPy 
is $250.00. 
6. That the plaintiff is well qualified both from the 
standpoint of formal education and years of experiencP 
in her chosen field of endeavor to earn suficient funds 
to adequately maintain herself. This was demonstrated 
throughout the time of the marriage and is particularlY 
true now that she has again taken foll-time employment. 
her employment at the time of the Decree having bePn 
only part-time, and the record of the default diyorce hear-
ing revealing that at said time plaintiff was under a 
doctor's care and presented a doctor's statement in sup-
port of a motion to shorten tiine for obtaining a divoref' 
because of illnPss. At the present time plaintiff is in good 
health. 
7. 'l'hat the agreement of tlH' partiPs and the sub-
sequent award of alimony was bast>d in part on the reeog-
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nition of plaintiff's efforts to assist defendant in obtain-
ing his medical education and the Court finds that her 
efforts were substantial in this regard since defendant's 
internship and residency years are deemed to be just 
as important to his over-all education as the more formal 
education obtained while in medical school, however, de-
fendant's formal education was substantially completed 
prior to marriage to the plaintiff, the marriage having 
occurred near Christmas of 1949 and the defendant hav-
ing graduated from medical school the following Spring. 
8. That the plaintiff was reasonably entitled to ali-
mony for a given period of time sufficient to pennit her 
to properly adjust to single life; as to the award and 
amount thereof at the time of the divorce decree, this 
Court makes no finding; however, to continue to allow 
permanent alimony in the amount provided for in the De-
cree in light of the present situation and circumstances 
of parties is unjust, unnecessary, and not equitable and 
the Decree should be consequently modified to provide 
for the payment of said amounts of alimony through the 
month of May, 1971, a period of four years in all, said 
payments to cease thereafter, except for the payment of 
the nominal sum of $1.00 per year necessary to preserve 
the right of plaintiff to future assistance should a true 
need arise. 
9. Plaintiff's actual earnings from employment 
from consultation work or fees as the same might be 
designated and from im'estments are sufficient to ade-
quately maintain her ,vithout dependence upon defendant. 
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10. Since the Divorce Decree herein, the defendant 
is remarried to a woman who has one child whose father 
is deceased, and defendant supports said wife and child· 
' and at the present time the plaintiff is a singlei woman. 
11. Since the Divorce Decree herein, defendant's 
costs of doing business has substantially increased; his 
income has increased but not commensurate with the in-
crease in cost of doing business. 
12. Plaintiff's income from employment, consulta-
tion work and investments is substantially higher than at 
the time of the Divorce Decree. 
13. Plaintiff, by the Divorce Decree, was assigned 
life insurance policy No. 316060 in the sum of $50,000.00, 
double indemnity, on defendant's life with permission by 
the property settlement agreement to "convert'' or 
"replace" the same with a different t~-pe, or other insur-
ance policy; subsequently plaintiff purportedly acting 
under this clause but with defendant's consent, obtained 
a new $60,000.00 double indemnity life insurance policy 
with a different insurance company on defendant's life 
retaining the old policy and neither replacing nor cancPl-
ling the old policy. Defendant has requested the Court 
to terminate plaintiff's rights under the Divorce Decree 
to maintain policies on defendant's life; however, defend-
ant has failed to present adequate evidence to justify thP 
Court in so doing. 
14. Substantial changes in the circumstances and 
situation of parties hereto han~ occurred since the date 
of the Divorce Decree. 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
(1) That the defendant is in contempt of the Court's 
prior alimony order as set forth in the Decree of Divorce. 
(2) That the plaintiff was reasonably entitled to 
alimony for a given period of time sufficient to permit 
her to properly adjust to single life; however, to continue 
to allow permanent alimony in the amount provided for 
in the Decree in light of the present situation and cir-
cumstances of parties, is unjust, unnecessary, and not 
equitable and the Decree should be consequently modified 
to provide for the payment of said amounts of alimony 
through the month of May, 1971, a period of four years 
in all, said payments to cease therafter, except for the 
payment of the nominal sum of $1.00 per year necessary 
to preserve the right of plaintiff to future assistance 
should a true need arise. 
( 3) This court determined that defendant should 
be sentenced to ten days in the County Jail as punishment 
for contempt, a stay of execution to be entered and de-
fendant given an opportunity to purge himself of said 
contempt by making all future payments of alimony 
promptly when due, and provided further, that he make 
immediate arrangements to pay all of the alimony ar-
rearage due to plaintiff, including the amounts thereof 
represented by judgments obtained. Since the date of the 
hearing and decision herein, defendant has paid such 
arrearage and judgments and should consequently be 
purged of such contempt subject only to making future 
payments in accordance with said decision. 
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( 4) The plaintiff should be restrained from levying 
any execntion herein so long as defendant abides by the 
conditions set forth in paragraph three above. 
( 5) That plaintiff should be awarded attorney fees 
in the amount of $250.00 in connection with the contempt 
matter. 
(6) Plaintiff's maintenance of life insurance on de-
fendant's life should not, at this time, be altered or pre-
vented by the Court. 
DATED this 2nd day of Febrnar)·, 1971. 
GORDON R. HALL, .JUDGE 
Duly attested and filed February 2, 1971. 
(Title of Court and Cause) 
NOTICE OF APP.B~AL 
198 The plaintiff, Lee C. Felt, hereby appeals to the Sn-
prerne Court of the State of Utah from an Order of the 
Court, modifying the Decree herein in fayor of the de-
fendant and against the plaintiff and from this Conrt's 
Order denying plaintiff's timel:· motion for a nt'". trial 
entered on February 2, 1971. 
DATED this 16th day of Febrnar:·, 1971 
YAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORKWALL & McCARTHY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Duly verified and filed Februar:· 17, 1971. 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
2 I, W. STERLING EVANS, Clerk of the above en-
titled Court, do hereby certify that the hereto attached 
files contain all the original papers as requested by 
Designation on file herein, filed in the Court in the above 
entitled case, including the Notice of Appeal filed on 
February 17, 1971. I further certify that the above de-
scribed documents constitute the Judgment Roll and that 
the same is a true and correct transcript of the record as 
it appears in my office. 
I further certify that an Undertaking on Appeal in 
due form has been properly filed and that the same was 
filed on February 17, 1971. 
I further certify that said Judgment Roll is this date 
transmitted to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, 
pursuant to such appeal. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said Court at 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this 30th day of March, 1971. 
s/W. Sterling E.vans 
Clerk Third District Court 
Duly certified and filed March 30, 1971. 
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